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Using a unique dataset, the author examines the impact of foreign portfolio investment on the capital 
issuance behavior of small listed firms. The author finds that foreign portfolio investment is associated 
with an increased probability of small firm security issuance in all nations, regardless of property rights 
development. Evidence suggests the mechanism by which this occurs is a freeing up of capital in 
domestic markets when large firms utilize the foreign investment directly. Debt levels in nations where 
property rights are more developed increase, suggesting that foreign portfolio investment may reach small 
firms through the banking channel as well as capital markets in these nations. 
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1.  Introduction 
The decision to invest abroad is typically a two-step process for investors. First, they decide in 
which country to invest. Second, they decide in which companies to invest. Studies such as Aggarwal, 
Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) find that disclosure at the firm level is an important determinant of firm 
choice for institutional investors. Since information asymmetry appears to be worst for smaller firms, 
foreign investors often steer clear of these firms, even if they are listed. This implies that investors that are 
looking for international diversification choose to invest in only the largest listed firms. Indeed, Dahlquist 
and Robertsson (2001), Kang and Stulz (1997), Edison and Warnock (2004), and Cai and Warnock 
(2004) all find that foreign owners prefer large firms. Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2007) find that 
information asymmetry and monitoring costs lead investors to choose firms with the least opaque 
earnings, also implying that foreign investment would go directly to large firms. As such, it isn’t 
immediately obvious whether small listed firms would benefit from foreign portfolio investment, defined 
by the International Monetary Fund as equity and debt issuances including country funds, depository 
receipts, and direct purchases by foreign investors of less than 10% control (Balance of Payments 
Manual, 1993). This is especially the case in countries where property rights are less strictly enforced. 
Although the likelihood of small firms accessing foreign capital directly is very small, foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI) could have implications on capital allocation in the domestic market. Wurgler 
(2000) finds that financial markets facilitate capital allocation. Since capital market liberalization allows 
for foreign investment and deepens financial markets (Henry, 2000),
1 one could argue that FPI could 
improve capital allocation. Thus, small public firms could see an improvement in their access to capital 
with an increase in the level of FPI.
2 
This suggests that FPI could actually improve access to finance for small listed firms. If FPI is 
beneficial to the access to financing of small listed firms, by what mechanism does it help? Does the 
impact of FPI on the access to financing of small listed firms change depending on the level of property 
rights protection? To answer these questions, this paper examines the impact of FPI on the access to  
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financing of small listed firms.
3 Specifically, I examine the extent to which FPI can help small public 
firms obtain financing for growth, even when markets and institutions in their countries are 
underdeveloped. I further examine which route this potential benefit takes: (1) through the capital 
markets, or (2) through bank lending. Finally, I examine whether the mechanism by which this benefit 
flows is through the availability of capital in the domestic markets (i.e., capital allocation). 
I find that the probability that a small listed firm issues capital in a given year increases with the 
level of FPI (scaled by the nation’s GDP). This relationship exists regardless of the development of 
property rights in the firm’s domicile nation. The route that FPI takes to reach small listed firms in nations 
with less developed property rights (LDPR) is through the capital markets only. This can be seen by the 
increased probability of domestic capital issuance along with decreased levels of short-term, long-term, 
and total debt. The route that FPI takes to reach small listed firms in nations with developed property 
rights (DPR) is through both capital markets and bank lending. Results show an increased probability of 
domestic capital issuance in these nations, as well as an increase in both long-term and total debt levels. 
The latter result implies that both the frequency and maturity of loans through banks and other financial 
institutions is increasing with FPI in these nations. These results lend support to the proponents of FPI 
and liberalization, casting doubt on the popular opinion that “hot money” is detrimental to firms. 
This paper contributes to three main areas of literature. The first is that of small firm access to 
capital. As markets become more integrated, FPI is a potential source of new investment capital for these 
firms. Information as to whether and how this additional source of capital increases access to financing 
for small firms is useful in extending this literature. 
This work is also related to the literature on global capital flows. As more countries consider 
reforming foreign investment policy to include foreign investors, this area of research becomes a resource 
for many. Providing evidence that is consistent with a positive impact of this capital flow at the firm level 
enhances the debate on the merit of FPI as a vehicle for growth. 
Finally, this research touches on that of liberalization. Although this research is not a study on 
liberalization, it offers insight into the impact of one of the capital flows that might result from the  
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opening of a country’s borders to foreign investment. Understanding what drives the aftermath of 
liberalization, such as the impact of a change in FPI, may offer insight into the debate on liberalization. 
The papers most related to mine are Harrison, McMillan, and Love (2004) and Laeven (2003).
4 
Although similar in intent, these papers differ from mine on many dimensions. Harrison et al. (2004) 
focus on the impact of foreign direct investment on the financial constraints of firms.
5  They examine 
foreign direct investment cash flows as a proportion of all foreign investment rather than the size of the 
market in question.
6 Laeven (2003) examines the impact of liberalization (reform policies that open 
financial markets to foreign direct and portfolio investment) on financial constraints rather than the 
specific cash flows resulting from said reformation. My paper differs from these in that I speak to access 
to capital (versus financial constraints) that can be directly measured by issuance data and accounting 
levels. 
Further, my papers differ from these with regard to data. Both Harrison et al. (2004) and Laeven 
(2003) use the Worldscope database. Since my emphasis is on small firms, I create a unique database of 
over 250,000 firm year observations across 43 countries merging two datasets to circumvent the larger 
firm bias from which many existing international databases suffer. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the mechanism by which FPI 
may be beneficial to small listed firms. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 provides the results, Section 6 the robustness analysis, and Section 7, the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Small Firm Access to finance 
Small firms tend to be dependent on bank lending to finance their growth (Cull, Davis, 
Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, 2005). A portion of small firms reach the capital markets and might use 
public financing to grow their businesses. Those who do access public capital markets (“listed” firms) 
might still rely, at least in part, on bank lending to finance their growth. As such, I examine two ways in  
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which FPI might reach the small firm: (1) through the capital markets, and (2) through banks, which, in 
turn, invest in or extend more credit to these small listed firms. 
 
2.1. Capital Markets 
Generally speaking, FPI flowing into a country increases the supply of capital in that country 
(ignoring for a moment the mechanism by which this occurs). If a small listed firm is unable to access 
capital because of capital supply limitations, an infusion of capital (i.e., in this case FPI) would increase 
the likelihood that a firm would be able to issue capital.
7 Empirically stated, 
 
H1. The probability of domestic capital issuance for small listed firms is significantly positively 
related to the level of FPI (scaled by the size of its domicile nation). 
 
The mechanism by which an increase in FPI could reach small firms is through a freeing up of 
domestic capital. This results from large firms (and likely only these firms) gaining access to the 
increased foreign capital. The additional capital supplied to large firms potentially frees up capital in the 
domestic market that would otherwise be absorbed by those large firms, implying a shift in capital 
allocation similar to that in Wurgler (2000). This may be tested empirically by evaluating whether large 
firms are less likely to issue capital domestically when FPI increases. Empirically stated this becomes: 
 
H2. The probability of domestic capital issuance for large listed firms is significantly negatively 
related to the level of FPI (scaled by the size of its domicile nation). 
 
2.2. Bank Lending 
For those small firms who are dependent on bank lending and/or remain unable to access publicly 
issued securities on a regular basis, the path of FPI through capital markets is potentially irrelevant. 
Instead, a path through financial institutions is relevant. The theory which motivates this path of  
  5
investment can be found in the bank lending theory of monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; 
Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that small 
banks are exceptionally sensitive to monetary policy. This is relevant as they are the banks inclined to 
serve small firms (see, e.g., Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) and Peek, J. and E. 
Rosengren (1995)). The lending theory finds that money supply tightening (expansion) appears to 
decrease (increase) the ability of banks to loan funds based on the relative illiquidity (liquidity) of their 
balance sheets. This implies that a positive money shock in a country will cause bank balance sheets to be 
relatively more liquid. This, in turn, enables them to increase the amount of credit extended to the public, 
or to "risk shift" their portfolio, extending more and/or longer-term debt to previously perceived “risky” 
clients. 
Although this money supply augmentation is due to monetary policy in Kashyap and Stein’s 
(2000) paper, this theory could arguably be extended to a different source of money supply augmentation: 
foreign portfolio inflows. An increase in the liquidity of a bank’s balance sheet through increased outside 
investment enables them to lend in the same manner as if there were changes in money supply caused by 
(unsterilized) monetary policy. This can occur through investment in the banking sector or due to the 
implications increased money supply has on the ability of banks to raise reservable forms of financing. If 
the amount of credit extended to small listed firms is increased, we would expect to see a corresponding 
increase in their level of debt, particularly long-term debt. More concisely stated: 
 
H3. Long-term debt levels of small listed firms are significantly positively related to the level of 







3. Empirical Method 
3.1. Capital Markets 
To examine the impact of FPI on the access to finance of small listed firms, I focus my analysis 
on the sub-sample of listed firms that have fewer total assets than the country-year median. Using annual 
medians within countries allows firms to move into and out of size categories as their assets would allow. 
The results of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity for FPI demonstrate that endogeneity 
is a concern. In support of this evidence are the results of Agarwal (1997), which indicate that the 
significant determinants of FPI are the (change in the) real exchange rate, share of the domestic capital 
market in the world capital market, and some proxy for economic activity. As such, I use an instrumental 
variable method that in the first stage regresses FPI on the above variables with relative interest rates 
(annual real interest rates scaled by the annual sample average) serving to explain the economic activity. I 
also include trailing FPI volatility to predict FPI with its significant determinants (Bekaert and Harvey, 
2003; Henry, 2000; Patro and Wald, 2005; Mukherjee, Bose, and Coondoo, 2002). The first stage 
regression then becomes: 
 
FPIj,t = β0 + β1ΔFXRatej,t-1 +  β2Sharej,t-1 + β3RelIntRatesj,t-1 + β4FPIVolj,t-1 +  ε   (1) 
 
To discern the impact of FPI on access to capital, I divide the sample into halves based on 
property rights (DPR nations are those with property rights = 1 or 2; LDPR nations are those with 
property rights = 3 or 4). I control for firm, time, and industry fixed effects. I further control for firm-level 
capital structure choice determinants to ensure that firms issue based on need, not based on capital 
structure decisions. I use a (IV) probit model due to the limited nature of the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable in this model is the probability of domestic capital issuance (i.e., y = 1 if a firm issues 
and y = 0 if it does not).  Empirically stated, this becomes: 
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Prob(y=1)i,t = Φ(ZB) 
= Φ( γ0 + γ1FPIj,t-1 + γ 2 Xi,t-1 + γ 3 Yj,t-1 + γ 4Ii + γ 5 t)  (2) 
 
where Φ represents the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, Z represents a vector of 
explanatory variables, and B is the vector of coefficients. FPI is the predicted level of FPI as a percentage 
of GDP resulting from the first stage (Equation 1) of the instrumental variable probit regression. X is a 
vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as cash, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset 
tangibility. These variables are included to control for times when firms would be more likely to issue 
securities (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables such as GDP 
growth, levels of other potential sources of capital such as foreign direct investment, domestic credit, and 
savings, and investment environment variables including invest, law and order, and corruption levels.
8 I is 
a vector of industry dummies to control for industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control 
for time effects in the panel. A description of the firm-, industry-, and country-specific variables is in the 
data section, as well as in the Appendix.  
The instrumental probit method uses a bootstrapping method that implements randomly chosen 
subsamples of the dataset with replacement to avoid dependence on assumptions regarding the normality 
of the distribution or the absence of stochastic influences on the data.
9 The bootstrapping technique is 
vital to ensuring that the standard errors are correct and that the resulting significance is accurate (i.e., not 
overstated). Based on hypothesis H1, I expect γ1 to be both positive and significant for small firms in 
DPR countries, and potentially the same for small firms in LDPR countries. 
To test H2, the mechanism by which FPI reaches small listed firms, I need to examine the impact 
of FPI on the domestic issuance of large listed firms. Since large firms are, in general, not financial 
constrained, I need to first determine the external financing needs of each firm. Following Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2002), I discern each firm’s financial need or “external funds  
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necessary” (EFN). Beck et al. (2002) derive this value from the “percentage of sales” approach to 
financial planning, calculating the external funds necessary as follows:
10 
 
EFNt = (ςt*)Assetst – (1 + ςt*) Earningst * RRt  (3) 
 
The first term in equation (3) refers to the assets necessary for firm growth. The second term is the 
internal financing available for said growth. Earnings are after taxes. RR is the retention ratio for the 
firm.
11 As noted in Beck et al. (2002), the use of the formula to discern external funds necessary depends 
on the true values of assets being reported (relative to their depreciable basis). To forecast growth for 
period t, ςt*, I utilize the fitted values of growth resulting from the following equation: 
 
Gi,t = α0 + β1Xi,t-1 + β2Yj,t-1 + β3Ii + β4t + ε   (4) 
 
where all variables are as defined in Equation (2). I adopt the Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach to 
obtain unconstrained growth rates for the sample since using firm-specific information would imply that 
the resulting predicted growth rates would be optimal.
12 To that end, fitted growth rates from the results 
of Equation (4) using U.S. firms only are mapped by both industry and size to all other countries and 
these observations are subsequently dropped from the analysis.
13 Doing so avoids any downward bias 
based on the inclusion of the firms that were used to obtain the unconstrained growth rates. 
Using a subsample of only large firms, defined as those firms with total assets greater than the 
annual country median, I drop those firms whose EFN (as determined in equation (3)) is negative. I then 
rerun the specification in Equations (1) and (2) to test H2. Based on my hypothesis, H2, I expect γ1 to be 




3.2. Bank Lending 
To address those small firms in my dataset that are at least, in part, reliant on bank debt, I 
examine the impact of FPI on short-term, long-term, and total debt levels. I examine this impact at the 
firm level to observe how total leverage, as well as the maturity of debt, changes with levels of FPI.
14 A 
decrease in the level of short-term debt, a debt maturity on which these firms most typically depend 
(Barclay and Smith, 1995), in favor of longer-term debt would imply increased access to finance. Indeed, 
longer-term debt provides capital over a longer term. Using a similar version of the regression in Equation 
(2) that uses as its regressand leverage, I regress the following using both OLS and Tobit methodologies: 
 
(Short-term/Long-term/Total) Lev i,t = φ0 + φ1FPIj,t-1 + φ2 X j,t-1 + φ3Yi,t-1 + φ4Ii + φ5 t + ε  (5) 
 
where Levi,t refers to the amount of leverage (short-term, long-term, and total; each regressed separately) 
firm i holds at time t. All other variables are as they appear in Equation (2). Real interest rates and fiscal 
burden, a measure of the average firm’s tax burden in a country, are added to the vector of 
macroeconomic variables, Y, to control for capital choice, as well as overall credit demand/supply issues. 
Specifically, fiscal burden is added to control for capital issuance choice with regard to tax 
minimalization. Real interest rates are added to account for the cost of raising debt and the possible 
implications of those costs on demand. FPI is once again the predicted level resulting from Equation (1). 
Relative interest rates are excluded due to its potential multicollinearity in Equation (5) once real interest 
rates are included. If FPI enhances the access to finance of small listed firms through an extension of the 
maturity of their outstanding debt, φ1 will be positive in specifications using long-term debt as the 






I obtain issuance data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database 
for the time period 1/1/1996-8/31/2005.
15 Following many empirical studies in corporate finance, I 
exclude regulated industries such as financial services and utilities firms. These firms do not operate in 
the same manner as unregulated firms and would likely confound the results if included. I also exclude 
those firms that have gone bankrupt because of the special set of issues that are included in capital 
structure determination when a company is failing. This exclusion follows the method of Asquith, 
Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) who find that such situations generally cause a major restructuring of 
capital structure outside of the scope of financial constraint relaxation. 
I collect over 49,000 domestic issuance observations of common stock, non-convertible debt, 
convertible debt, non-convertible preferred stock, and convertible preferred stock. The exclusion of 
international issuances is intentional due to the endogeneity between FPI and international issues. Only 
one issue per year is retained for each company to avoid upward bias in the results toward issuing capital. 
Dropping multiple issuance observations for firm years leaves 32,703 observations. Financials for the 
companies issuing domestically are hand collected from Reuters. This approach, although extremely time 
consuming, provides a much richer sample than afforded by SDC Platinum alone. Reuters provides 
financial information on all publicly traded firms for the majority of countries in the world and, as such, 
does not suffer from the bias toward large firms that other international databases such as 
Worldscope/Datastream/Research Insight do. In fact, according to Reuters, financials are provided for 
over 90% of the firms covered. A list of the cumulative firm year issuances by country is provided in 
Table 1. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
The only firms not covered in Reuters are those that have gone bankrupt or have merged with 
another firm. Bankrupt firms are deliberately excluded from the sample as previously mentioned above.  
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The absence of merged firms would only be a problem if the issuing company had acquired a firm (or was 
acquired by a firm) that is vastly different in its issuing behavior than the remainder of the sample.  
Adding to the 32,703 observations of capital issuance, I collect data for those years that these 
issuing companies do not issue to create a panel dataset.
16 I also collect data on firms not issuing capital 
during the sample period (1996-2005) to represent those public companies that either cannot issue capital 
or have sufficient funds internally. When these non-issuer firm-year observations are included to my 
dataset, the number of observations exceeds 250,000 firm-year observations. 
Seven countries out of the original 53 are dropped due to insufficient data.
17 In these cases, there 
are only one or two observations of capital issuance, not enough from which to obtain any statistically 
significant results. Two more countries, Taiwan and Bermuda, are dropped due to insufficient 
macroeconomic data. The exclusion of these countries decreases the sample size by 3,294 firm year 
observations, which is less than 2% of the overall sample. 
Cross-country studies that examine equity issues often exclude Australia due to their unique form 
of equity rights issues. This form of offering allows the existing shareholders to decide whether they 
would like to accept a certain amount of shares based on a pre-determined ratio at a price lower than 
market value. These equity offerings are typically excluded (or the entire country in the cross-country 
sample) as it affects firm fundamentals such as share capital, book value per share, earnings per share, and 
the liquidity of the stock. The inclusion of these observations would clearly bias the results, so they are 
excluded. With the exclusion of Australia, the number of countries in the final sample is 43. 
Firm-level data are winsorized at 1% to minimize the biasing impact of outliers. A full list of 
summary statistics for the dataset is provided in Table 2. 
 





4.1. Firm-Specific Information 
Databases, such as Reuters, obtain financials for these listed companies from the exchanges. To 
the extent that these exchanges have different reporting requirements, financial definitions might vary. 
Differences in currency value are avoided by using ratios, which are comparable across countries. Ratios 
are obtained by scaling by total assets unless otherwise noted. 
As many empiricists have attributed size as a determinant of capital structure, which could have 
implications on capital issuance, I assign size categories based on total assets. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) 
and Baker and Wurgler (2002) find a positive relation between leverage and size. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) find that size influences not only the extent of leverage, but also the type.
18 Firms that have total 
assets less (more) than the country-year median are classified as Small (Large). 
Leverage itself plays a role in the timing of issuance for many firms as found in the market timing 
literature (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Baker and Wurgler; 2002). I include this 
variable to control for any implications market timing or capital structure may have on firm issuance. 
Profitability of firms would be an obvious influence since it impacts how well a firm could fund 
positive net present value (NPV) projects internally (i.e., avoiding external fundraising). Following 
Titman and Wessels (1988), I calculate this variable as operating income divided by sales. Another 
obvious influence is the perceived level of risk for a firm. I calculate this as the standard deviation of the 
return on assets for time t-3 through time t-1. 
Also relevant is asset tangibility. This variable refers to how palpable the assets of a firm are and 
relates to a small firm's access to capital concerns through its limitations on debt levels based on the 
ability to provide collateral. A firm with fewer tangible assets is thought to have an increased probability 
of bankruptcy since it would have less ability to raise funds through liquidation in times of financial 
distress. I calculate this variable by dividing fixed assets by the book value of assets (following Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). 
To correct for any additional access a firm might have in other nations (Lins, Strickland, and 
Zenner, 2005), it is vital to include an indication of whether a firm has listings in other countries (e.g., an  
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American Depository Receipt on a U.S. stock exchange for a non-U.S. firm).
19 Thus, I have included a 
dummy variable for cross-listing that takes on a value of one if a firm is listed on an exchange outside of 
its nation of domicile and zero otherwise. 
 
4.2. Industry Information 
Differences in industry classification are avoided by using the issuers’ (one digit) primary SIC 
code as an industry indicator. Industry dummies are included to account for any industry fixed effects. 
 
4.3. Macroeconomic Information 
To control for the impact of other potential sources of funds for firms, I include savings, domestic 
credit, and foreign direct investment. Savings is calculated as the difference between gross domestic 
product and consumption. Domestic credit is the level of credit extended by financial institutions 
domestically. Foreign direct investment is included to control for the effect provided by the more stable of 
the two global capital flows on capital issuance. This inclusion is important given the fact that the impact 
of foreign direct investment is likewise beneficial for alleviating financing constraints (Harrison et al., 
2004). To control for business cycle effects, I include GDP growth. 
Fiscal burden, from Heritage Foundation, is used to control for the tax implications of debt in the 
bank-lending route of FPI analysis.  This variable takes into consideration the proven relation between 
taxes and lending in a multinational setting (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004). 
  Controlling for the investment environment, I include investment, law and order, and corruption, 
which are indices reflecting the investment risk facing foreign investors, the level of legal development, 
and the level of corruption, respectively, in a country. All three indices are created by the International 
Country Risk Guide and collectively reflect the investment environment of a country. The inclusion of 
proxies for the extent to which a country’s investment environment attracts investors follows the method 
of Beck et al. (2002) and Beck et al. (2005), as well as many other examinations of access to financing in  
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an international setting. Papers such as Claessens and Laeven (2003), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) point out the importance of the investment environment as a determinant of 
financial development. 
  The variable of interest in this study, FPI, is included in its net form (inflows minus outflows) for 
the countries in the sample. This data was collected from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and includes debt and equity investments made by investors foreign to the issuer’s domicile nation. 
Figures are given as net levels and are scaled by a proxy for the size of the nation, the country’s GDP. 
Instruments of the variable of interest are included due to the endogenous nature of FPI. Relative 
interest rates are included to control for investor demand for interest-bearing securities in the firm’s 
domicile nation versus those of other countries (Samak and Helmy, 2000). Share is included to address 
the attractiveness of a given economy based on market capitalization (generally in more developed capital 
markets), or the decrease in the cost of equity and the resulting increase in the price of existing shares that 
occurs with market integration (Patro and Wald, 2005; Henry, 2000). To provide an additional 
determinant of international trade/investment, I include the change in real foreign exchange rates to 
provide a meaningful value indicator of capital investments (Agarwal, 1997). FPI volatility is calculated 
as the variance of FPI levels for the trailing three year term (time t-3 through t-1). These scaled values are 
used to elicit predicted values of scaled net foreign portfolio capital flows based on the work of Agarwal 
(1997). Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003), Henry (2000), Patro and Wald (2005), and a host of other 
papers address this multi-faceted environment. 
  The basis of nation type for the analysis, property rights, is used to examine the ultimate impact 
of the importance of the development of the same. This variable is chosen following La Porta et al. (1997) 
and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), who find the importance of security law and investor 
protection significant. This variable is an appraisal by the Heritage Foundation of the level of freedom an 
individual has to accumulate personal property. It is based on the extent and enforcement of laws 
designed to protect property accumulation. Specifically, it takes into consideration the independence of a 
country’s judiciary system as well as the ability of an individual to enforce his right to hold property  
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through contracts. The level of corruption in the country is also taken into consideration. The index uses a 
scale from 1 (maximum freedom) to 5 (minimum freedom). The sample used in this paper includes 
countries with scores between 1 and 4. 
Descriptions, as well as sources, of both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables and 
definitions of financial data used in the analysis are provided in Appendix A. 
 
(Insert Appendix A about here) 
 
4.4. Data Correlation 
Table 3 provides correlation matrices for all variables used in the analysis. There are no notable 
significant relationships in the firm-specific data. The only variables that exhibit significant correlation 
are some of the macro variables. The correlation of several macroeconomic variables is significant and is 
generally an issue in many international studies. As a result, empirical examinations using different 
specifications, including select macroeconomic variables and the subsequent addition of problematic 
variables, are used to provide robustness to the results given the potential empirical biases based on the 
correlation between the macroeconomic independent variables. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
5. Results 
5.1. The Impact of FPI on Capital Issuance 
Intuitively appealing is the fact that in DPR nations, variables such as leverage and cash are 
significantly positively related, and risk and profitability are significantly negatively associated with 
capital issuance. In LDPR nations, there are fewer significant firm level variables suggesting that access 
to capital has less to do with these characteristics and more to do with country-level influences and  
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infrastructure. Leverage and cash are exceptions, exhibiting a significant positive and negative 
relationship with capital issuance, respectively. Overall, firm level variables exhibit the expected marginal 
coefficients and, as such, are left out for brevity. 
Coefficients on macroeconomic control variables exhibit reasonable signs. In LDPR nations [see 
Table 4, specifications (5) through (8)], domestic credit exhibits a negative association with capital 
issuance, demonstrating that bank credit is a substitute for accessing capital from the public markets in 
these nations. In DPR nations [specifications (1) through (4)], domestic credit serves as an additional 
source of capital as demonstrated by the positive significant coefficients. Savings has a positive 
significant association with capital issuance in LDPR nations demonstrating that savings is yet another 
source of capital which provides liquidity for a nation. Interestingly, foreign direct investment only has a 
significant (marginal) impact in LDPR nations. GDP growth in DPR nations is positive and significant 
suggesting that when times are good, firms issue securities to fund growth (perhaps suggesting market 
timing). GDP growth in LDPR nations, however, is largely insignificant. This could be due to the fact that 
firms in these nations are typically more constrained, needing funding for growth in both good times and 
bad. 
The results of the analysis support the contention that FPI increases the access to financing of 
small listed firms. The marginal effect of FPI (scaled by GDP) shown in Table 4 is positive and 
significant. Indeed, the probability that a small listed firm issues in a given year increases by 2.25% with 
a one standard deviation increase in FPI standardized by GDP [see Specification (1)].
20 Controlling for 
the investment environment variables such as investment, law and order, and corruption does not change 
the magnitude or the significance of the impact of FPI on access to finance [see Specifications (2)-(4)]. 
Looking to LDPR nations in Table 4, we again see a positive marginal effect of FPI. The 
magnitude for these firms, however, is considerably greater. Indeed, a one standard deviation increase in 
FPI (scaled by GDP) results in an increased probability of issuance of 22.54% [see Specification (5)]! 
Adding investment environment control variables, we see economically important impacts ranging from 
19.28%-28.37% [see Specifications (6)-(8)]. First stage results may be found in Appendix B. Partial  
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scatter plots derived from Specification (1) of Table 4 complement the analysis and may be found in 
Figure 1. 
(Insert Appendix B about here) 
(Insert Figure I about here) 
 
It is interesting to note the impact of the investment environment (Investment, Law and Order, 
Corruption) on small firm access to finance. For DPR nations, the stronger the legal system and the 
greater the observance of the law, the less likely it is that a small listed firm will issue securities. This 
could suggest that large firms have more influence on the laws that are put into place with regard to 
securities. In LDPR nations, investment has a negative and significant coefficient, implying that as a 
government’s attitude toward inward investment improves, small firms will be less likely to issue 
securities. It is possible that this variable describes more the government’s attitude toward foreign direct 
investment (versus foreign portfolio investment). Governmental policies put into place to level the 
playing field for foreign (direct) investors can increase competition and squelch investment. Indeed, 
Agosin and Machado (2005) find that foreign direct investment can, in some cases, actually hinder 
domestic investment. The coefficient on corruption is also negative for LDPR nations.  This is likely due 
to the fact that bribery may have an instrumental role in small firms accessing capital in these nations. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
These impacts, taken collectively, imply that FPI reaches small firms in both DPR and LDPR 
nations directly through the capital market, effectively increasing the access to finance for small listed 
firms. This implies that the financial markets of the U.S. and other developed nations can confer benefits 
on developing nations by helping to fund the growth of small firms in those nations whose markets cannot 
perform this function alone.  
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Table 5 provides evidence that the mechanism by which FPI reaches small firms is through a 
freeing up of capital in the domestic market. FPI has a negative impact on the probability of domestic 
capital issuance for large firms that have a need for external financing. This effect exists marginally in 
DPR nations, as evidenced by significant coefficients in Specifications (1) and (3). On average, the 
negative impact of a one standard deviation increase in FPI scaled by GDP is 1.48% (some specifications 
lack statistical significance) in these nations. This effect is seen more extensively in LDPR nations [see 
Specifications (5)-(8)]. The average impact in these nations is 2.36%. This suggests that large firms, 
which are more than likely the direct beneficiary of an increase in foreign investment, are less likely to 
issue capital in domestic markets due to their increased access to global capital. Meshing nicely with the 
results found in Table 4 where small firms in LDPR nations benefited to a greater extent from an increase 
in FPI, greater statistical significance and greater marginal effects are seen for large firms in LDPR 
nations. 
These results compliment those found in Wurgler (2000), which are that “developed financial 
markets increase investment more in growing industries.” Although the results in this paper are due to 
outside capital entering the domestic market and not the domestic market itself developing, the effect on 
the amount of capital is the same. Likewise, instead of growing industries, we are speaking of growing 
firms (relative to the large firms). The analogous result found in Wurgler (2000) adds credence to these 
findings. 
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
5.2. The Impact of FPI on Credit Availability 
Table 6 indicates statistically significant evidence consistent with an increase in both long-term 
debt and total debt in DPR nations. This is seen in a significant increase in the portion of long-term debt 
[Specification (3) and (4)] as well as the total amount of debt [Specification (5) and (6)] with a  
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corresponding increase in FPI. The choice of empirical methodology, either OLS or Tobit, seems to be 
irrelevant as both methodologies lead to the same qualitative conclusions. These impacts demonstrate 
some evidence of an extension of the bank lending channel of monetary transmission (Kashyap and Stein, 
2000) to generic money shocks in DPR nations. The statistically significant increase in long-term and 
total debt suggests better access to capital and perhaps a lengthening of the maturity of debt. This could 
imply that when FPI flows into a DPR country, banks are able to "risk shift" their portfolio to include 
more risky holdings, potentially including longer-term and/or more frequent loans to small firms. 
Although part (or all) of this empirical finding could be due to public debt issuance, the dependence of 
small firms on bank loans suggests that these results are likely due, at least in part, to FPI’s influence on 
bank lending. 
The impact of FPI on debt levels in LDPR nations is almost a mirror image to that in DPR 
nations. All three forms of debt, short-term, long-term, and total debt, appear to be significantly 
negatively influenced by FPI [see Specifications (7)-(12)]. These findings suggest that an extension of the 
bank lending channel does not exist in LDPR nations. These results are not surprising considering the 
volatility of FPI capital flows and the less supportive property rights in these nations. It appears that the 
same investment environment that limits the amount of FPI that enters a nation precludes any benefits that 
FPI capital flows might offer through the banking channel. In fact, it suggests that there may be a 
substitution effect between bank lending and FPI. Giannetti (2007) supports this notion by establishing a 
reverse relationship between capital inflows and the stability of bank lending in less developed nations. 
This effect combined with the results of Table 4, wherein small firms in DPR nations are more 
able to access capital with a corresponding increase in FPI, suggests that these firms are able to obtain 
access from the capital markets and, perhaps, additional sources of bank credit. The mechanism by which 
small listed firms in LDPR nations receive the benefits of FPI, however, is strictly through capital 
markets. Banks and capital markets seem to be substitutes in these countries. This notion is supported by 
the coefficient on domestic credit for LDPR nations in Table 4. 
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(Insert Table 6 about here) 
6. Robustness 
6.1. Interactions with Investment Environment Variables 
Examining the interactive effect of FPI with investment environment variables gives us a better 
idea of the effect of FPI on small firm access to capital across levels of investment environment (i.e., 
levels of investment, law and order, and corruption variables). Examining the implications of FPI when 
interacted with these variables on the entire dataset (across firm size and property rights development) 
offers further insight into the importance of the investment environment.  
The results are similar to those of La Porta et al. (1997), Bekaert and Harvey (2003), and Wurgler 
(2000). The impact of FPI including investment (a variable that refers to a government’s attitude toward 
foreign investment and the resulting risk of foreign investment in that country) is one that implies 
decreasing margin to return. For those governments that are hostile to foreign investment (e.g., investment 
= sample mean minus the sample standard deviation), the marginal impact of FPI on access to capital is 
large, 8.71% for each standard deviation increase in FPI. For those governments already open to FPI, the 
marginal effect of becoming more so is less. Those governments with an investment index equal to the 
sample mean plus the sample standard deviation would see only a 0.92% marginal benefit of a one 
standard deviation increase in FPI. 
The impact of FPI given corruption is also influential. The cumulative impact suggests that the 
impact of FPI in the presence of this variable is pivotal. For example, looking to those nations where 
corruption is rampant (e.g., corruption = sample mean minus sample standard deviation), the cumulative 
impact of a one standard deviation increase in FPI is positive for firm access to capital (3.09%). In those 
nations where corruption is well under control (e.g., corruption = sample mean plus sample standard 
deviation), the impact is equally large with regard to magnitude, but negative at -2.98%. These results 
suggest that there are decreasing returns to scale for corruption as well. In fact, nations with a corruption  
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index slightly higher than the mean (i.e., lower levels of corruption) no longer receive a marginal benefit 
from FPI if they continue to clean up corruption. 
The impact of FPI given a law and order scenario appears to be the most relevant investment 
environment variable. It, too, possesses decreasing returns to scale. Firms in nations where this index is 
low (e.g., law = sample mean minus sample standard deviation) can expect a 3.41% increase in access to 
capital with a one standard deviation increase in FPI. Those nations where law and order is more 
developed (e.g., law = sample mean plus sample standard deviation), however, will see a 13.27% 
decrease with a one standard deviation increase in FPI. This once again suggests that law and order is 
important to a certain point.  Beyond that point, improvements in law and order can actually limit the 
allocation of capital that results from FPI.  Results can be found in Table 7. 
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
6.2. Definitions of Key Variables 
6.2.1. FPI Definition 
Performing sensitivity analysis around the definition of the key variable, FPI, provides robustness 
for the results. I use three alternate definitions for FPI: (1) FPI net flows scaled by gross private capital 
flows into a nation, (2) the base definition (i.e., FPI/GDP) winsorized at 1%, and (3) percentage change in 
FPI net flows. The first definition is the same as that used in Harrison et al. (2004). Using this definition, 
the majority of the results remain. The only significant difference is found in Specification (6). The 
coefficient on FPI is no longer significant as it was in Table 4. This answer reconciles the results found in 
this paper with those in Harrison et al. (2004). I interpret this difference not as a weakening of the 
implications of this paper, but as a clarification of what is important with regard to FPI and access to 
capital. Specifically, this difference would suggest that it is not the portion of FPI in total capital flows 
that matters with regard to access to capital, but rather the level of FPI relative to the size of the nation 
that is important. The second definition provides results that are qualitatively identical to the results found  
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in Tables 4-6. The last definition leads to results that are identical save those for large firms in LDPR 
nations. The coefficient in this specification is no longer significant, once again pointing to the relevance 
of the FPI flow relative to the size of the nation. Results are provided in Table 8, Panel A. 
 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
6.2.2. FPI Volatility Definition 
  Altering the definition for FPI volatility by lengthening the term over which volatility is 
calculated (from three years) to five years does not qualitatively change the results. This adds to the 
credence of our results and allays fears that noise in the calculated volatility does not bias the results. 
Results are provided in Table 8, Panel A. 
 
6.3. Sample Inclusion 
6.3.1.  Excluding Countries with Capital Control Changes  
To see if the test results are sensitive to sample country inclusion criteria, I drop countries that 
might bias results due to changes in capital control policy or the existence of specific laws that may bias 
results such as those in China where only B shares were offered on the market for foreign investors during 
this term and foreign banking was not possible before 2002. Dropped countries in this specification 
include China, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Chile.
21 Results in DPR nations remain constant. In LDPR 
nations, however, results change considerably. Specifically, the coefficient on FPI when regressed on 
long-term debt [Specification (9)] is no longer significant and the coefficients on FPI when regressed on 
both short-term and total debt [Specifications (8) and (10)] turn positive. Assuming legitimate arguments 
for the exclusion of these countries with capital control changes, weak evidence of the bank lending 
channel could be seen. Although a lengthening of the maturity of debt is not seen, i.e., no significance in  
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Specification (9), a statistically significant increase in both short-term and total debt in LDPR nations in 
definitely encouraging. Results can be found in Table 8, Panel B. 
 
6.3.2. Size  Groupings 
Changing the definition of “Small” from less than the country-year median to the bottom tercile 
of firms in each country-year, results change slightly. In LDPR nations, the coefficient on FPI when 
regressed on short-term debt [Specification (8)] is no longer significant. This does not materially change 
the implications put forth in the credit availability section since the evidence found in the base 
specifications (Table 6) did not support the bank lending channel in these (LDPR) nations. Results are 
provided in Table 8, Panel B. 
 
6.3.3.  Equity Issues Only 
  To address concerns that the inclusion of all types of capital issuances might be problematic, I 
rerun the base specifications for Tables 4-6 using only equity issuances. Results are identical with regard 
to statistical significance and vary only slightly with regard to magnitude of the marginal effects. This 
serves to reinforce the results, and suggests that lumping the issuance of several types of capital together 
in this analysis does not bias the results. Results are provided in Table 8, Panel B. 
 
6.3. Methodology Extrapolation 
6.3.1. Clustering at the Industry Level 
To ensure that results are not spurious due to a missing industry-level variable in the 
specification, I perform the base specification clustering errors at the industry level. Coefficients for 
industry-level clustering are slightly different due to the absence of industry dummies in these 
specifications. As is evident from Panel E of Table 8, results for industry clustering differ only with 
regard to the FPI coefficient when regressed on long-term debt [Specifications (4)]. The coefficient loses  
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its significance as compared with that found in Table 6, although it is very close to be significant at the 
10% level. This weakens only slightly the implications regarding FPI reaching small firms through the 
banking channel in DPR nations. Results are provided in Table 8, Panel C. 
 
6.3.2. Country Dummies 
  Including country dummies to ensure that there is not a missing country-level variable biasing 
results, results change only slightly. Only the coefficients for FPI regressed on long-term debt change 
materially [Specification (4) and (8)]. Specifically, they lose statistical significance as the impact of the 
country specifics subsumes the impact of FPI on long-term debt.  That said, results with country dummies 
should be taken lightly since there is a much greater chance of multicollinearity. I include these results for 
the sake of thoroughness only. Results are provided in Table 8, Panel C. 
 
6.3.3. Frequency Weights 
  To ensure that the diversity in the number of observations per country is not confounding the 
results, I add frequency weights to the analysis done in Tables 4-6. This methodology accounts for the 
frequency of country observations to ensure that diversity in the number of observations across countries 
does not bias results. Coefficients, as well as significance levels (1%), remain for all specifications except 
for Specification (2). Using the frequency weights, the significance of the coefficient on FPI for large 
firms is now at 1%. In Table 5 [Specification (1)], this coefficient was significant at 5%. This suggests 
that the frequency of country observations could be biasing the results for large firms. Once the regression 
methodology controls for differences in the number of observations per country, results are stronger. 







Small firms play a distinctive and influential role in both the present and future economic 
situations in which nations find themselves. Access to financing for these firms is exacerbated by both 
firm- and macro-level influences. As such, supplementary sources of financing that either directly or 
indirectly improve the access to finance of small listed firms are worthy of investigation. Examining the 
importance of FPI in the capital issuance process, I find that FPI enhances the access to finance for small 
listed firms in countries across property rights development. Results suggest that the route that FPI takes 
to reach small listed firms is through capital markets.  An additional route through the bank lending 
channel exists in nations with developed property rights. The mechanism by which this occurs appears to 
be through a freeing up of domestic capital.  This result is particularly apparent in nations with less 
developed property rights. 
The positive influence of FPI on small firm access to capital supports the ideals of those who 
strive for optimal policy reformation in nations that do not support foreign investment and in markets that 
are excessively volatile or underdeveloped with regard to investor property rights. Easing FPI restrictions 
on capital flows, stabilizing these investment cash inflows, and improving the treatment of foreign 
companies and investors could have a very real influence on the longevity of the small firm.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A: Firm- and Industry-Specific 
Variable  Definitions 
Asset tangibility  Fixed assets divided by the book value of total assets; industry average is used in cases of missing data. 
FA/TA 
Cash  Cash or cash-equivalent divided by total assets. Cash/TA 
Cross-listing  Dummy variable equal to one if a firm has stock listed on foreign exchanges and zero otherwise. 
Leverage  The logarithm of total liabilities divided by total assets. ln(Short-term, Long-term or Total) Liabilities/TA 
Profitability Operating  income divided by sales. OpInc/Sales (in Thous) 
Risk  The log of the variance of the firm’s profitability ratio over the three years prior to issue; industry average is 
used in cases of missing data. ln(var(ROAt, ROAt-1, ROAt-2)) 
Industry  Primary 1 digit SIC codes. 
Panel B:  Macroeconomic   
Variable Definitions  Source 
Corruption 
An index from 0 (most) to 6 (least) of perceived corruption in a country based on the 
likelihood of solicited bribes from a country in relation to such factors of business as 





Credit provided by financial institutions, with the exception of credit to the central 
government, scaled by gross domestic product. 
WDI 
Fiscal Burden  A score from 1 (low) to 5 (high) assigned to a country based on the income tax rates, 
corporate tax rates, and government expenditures as percentage of output. 
Heritage Foundation 
FDI  Foreign direct investment is investment by investors outside the home country that is 
concerned with longer-term ownership or a controlling interest of more than 10%. 
WDI 
FPI 
Foreign portfolio investment excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities' 
reserves covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars and are scaled by gross domestic product. 
WDI 
FPI Volatility  The variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1.  WDI; own 
calculation 
GDP Growth  GDP per capital growth (%).  WDI 
Invest 
A measure from 0 (worst/closed) to 12 (best/open) of the government's attitude toward 
inward investment as determined by four components: 1) the risk to operations, 2) 




An index from 0 (less) to 6 (more) of law of a nation. It is two measures comprising 
one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the total. The "law" sub-
component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the "order" 










Annual interest rates adjusted for inflation.  WDI 
Relative 
Interest Rates 
Annual real interest rates scaled by annual sample average.  WDI 
Savings  Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure 
(total consumption) as a percentage of GDP. 
WDI 






The annual percentage change in the official exchange rate as determined by national 
authorities or the rate determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market (annual or 
averaged annually from monthly rates). 
WDI  
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Appendix B: First Stage Regression for FPI Levels 
 
  Developed Property Rights (N=57,247)  Less Developed Property Rights (N=9,169) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8 
GDP  Growth  -0.096*** -0.077*** -0.055*** -0.089*** 0.138***  -0.001  0.121*** 0.079*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  0.387***  0.449*** 0.330*** 0.381*** -0.069***  -0.067***  -0.083*** -0.076*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Domestic Credit  0.007***  0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Savings  -0.315*** -0.358*** -0.343*** -0.330*** -0.184*** -0.149*** -0.183*** -0.179*** 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Share  -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.014*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
ΔFXChg  0.087*** 0.106*** 0.071*** 0.092*** -0.030***  -0.025***  -0.031*** -0.029*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
RelIntRates 0.818***  0.633***  0.388*** 0.625*** -0.084***  -0.024***  -0.068*** -0.113*** 
  [0.043] [0.043] [0.045] [0.044] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 
FPIVol  -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 0.020***  0.012***  0.025*** 0.030*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
Invest    -0.006***      0.003***    
    [0.000]      [0.000]    
Law     -0.011***      0.001***  
     [0.000]      [0.000]  
Corruption      -0.004***      0.006*** 
      [0.000]      [0.000] 
Constant 0.060***  0.142***  0.123*** 0.080*** 0.046*** 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.031*** 
  [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
R-squared  0.484 0.496 0.493 0.487 0.490 0.520  0.492  0.519 
Notes. First stage regression results are shown for the following probit model: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = γ0 + γ1FPIj,t-1 + γ 2Xi,t-1 + γ 3Yj,t-1 + γ 4Ii + γ 5t + ε where FPI is foreign portfolio investment 
standardized by gross domestic product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression:  FPIj,t = β0 + β1ΔFXRatej,t-1 +  β2Sharej,t-1 + β3RelIntRatesj,t-1 + 
β4FPIVolj,t-1 +  ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market capitalization scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates is the annual real interest rates of 
country j scaled by sample average calculated annually. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. Development groups are based on the level of property rights in a nation. Only small 
firms are tested. Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables including the following: GDP Growth is the average growth rate in gross domestic product of country j. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level 
of foreign direct investment scaled by country j’s GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. Savings is the difference between GDP 
and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived risk facing foreign investors. Law and Order is an index referring to the development of the legal system. Corruption is an index that 
reflects the level of corruption. X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset tangibility. I is a vector of industry dummies to control for 
industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effects in the panel. Observations are firm year specific and for the term 1996-2005. Firm level control variables are left out 
for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered around issuer are in brackets. Marginal effects of the variables are provided. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 See also Kim and Singal (2000), who find that liberalization improves returns and Bekaert and Harvey (2000), who find that 
liberalization decreases the cost of capital.  Both of these could have positive externalities with regard to small firm access to 
capital. 
2 Alternatively, an increase in asset values of purely domestic firms based on the cross-listing of international firms may improve 
access to finance for these firms (i.e., small listed firms). Eun, Claessens, and Jun (1995) show theoretically that this positive 
asset-pricing spill-over effect might occur when markets become partially integrated.  According to Miller and Puthenpurackal 
(2002), however, this effect would be mostly felt in countries where property rights were protected.  For this reason, I do not use 
this as a theoretical basis.   
3 Small is defined here as listed firms that have total assets less than the country-year median.  This paper does not attempt to 
empirically examine private firms. Number of employees is not used due to lack of data and resultant sample selection problems. 
4 See also Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006) who do an analogous examination to Harrison, McMillan, and Love (2004) 
looking at financial development and cash flow sensitivity. 
5 See Goldstein and Razin (2006) for a theoretical motivation of the choice between foreign direct investment and foreign 
portfolio investment. 
6 Foreign direct investment is defined by the IMF as investment that is concerned with longer-term ownership (contrasted with 
foreign portfolio investment, which is often considered short-term) or a controlling interest of more than 10% (Balance of 
Payments, 1993). 
7 According to Beck et al. 2003, small firms are financially constrained so often that small is a good proxy for financial 
constraint. Because this is the case, one can assume that whether a firm issues capital or not is indicative of whether they can 
access markets. 
8 Results are robust to using three-year trailing averages for all macroeconomic variables.  These results were included in a 
previous version of the paper and are available upon request. 
9 N=50 is used for bootstrap replication; both stages of the regression are performed for each draw. 
10 Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also use this methodology. 
11 I assume this is 100% to be conservative. This assumption would tend to bias results toward a rejection of the hypothesis. 
12 Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine inter-country differences between industries based on both macro and firm-specific  
information. 
13 This results in 52,276 observations being dropped. 
14 I am not able to observe the impact of FPI on trade credit. This is an unfortunate limitation of the data. 
15 Global new issues are not consistently available preceding 1996 in SDC.   
16 Issuances include IPOs. The sample is not limited to those that were public on 1/1/1996. 
17 These countries are Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxembourg, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, and Bangladesh. 
18 The analyses are also done using average size of the eight-year period.  As results persist, they are omitted for brevity. 
19 All forms of cross-listing are treated the same here (e.g., Level I, II, or III ADR programs, private placement (Rule 144A) or 
Canadian direct listing. 
20 This number is obtained by multiplying the coefficient in Specification 1 of Table 4 by the standard deviation of FPI (scaled by 
GDP), which is found, rounded to the nearest hundredth, in Table 2. 
21 South Korea was liberalized in 1998, two years after the first year of the examination period.  Chile initiated the encaje, which 
is legislation that might have had an impact on FPI levels, and Hong Kong did not have FPI levels for part of the sample period.  
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Table 1. Security Issuances and Investment Environment 
 
Country Debt  Issues 
Equity 











Panel A:  Developed Property Rights Nations 
Austria 6  63  69  102.85  2.00E+09  2.10E+11  1 
Belgium 35  90  125  112.11  -1.58E+11  2.49E+11  1 
Canada 323  2,280  2,603  46.96  -5.49E+09 6.78E+11  1 
Chile 69  115  184  60.97  -7.88E+08  7.08E+10  1 
Denmark 6  116  122  72.02  -3.23E+09  1.72E+11  1 
Finland 12  122  134  150.94  -2.45E+09 1.28E+11  1 
Germany 60  578  638  270.76  1.05E+09  2.11E+12  1 
Hong Kong  58  1,222  1,280  36.40  -9.27E+09 1.61E+11  1 
Ireland 4  74  78  136.73  -1.36E+10  9.42E+10  1 
Netherlands 27  182 209  330.58  -9.71E+09 4.00E+11  1 
New Zealand  21  91  112  55.06  -6.26E+07 6.06E+10  1 
Norway 12  150  162  64.58  -1.15E+10  1.65E+11  1 
Singapore  144 510 654  42.18  -1.09E+10  8.77E+10  1 
United Kingdom  99  2,839  2,938  77.12 4.15E+10  1.43E+12  1 
United  States  2,238 5,617 7,855 178.66  2.16E+11  8.99E+12  1 
Switzerland 95  122 217  228.34  -2.03E+10 2.72E+11  1.125 
Japan  1,743 3,127 4,870 81.77  -4.50E+10 4.40E+12  1.25 
Sweden 18  315  333  111.51  -1.40E+10  2.47E+11  1.625 
Thailand  122 242 364  39.26  7.73E+08 1.35E+11  1.75 
France 68  750  818  169.94  -9.87E+09  1.44E+12  2 
Hungary 0  12  12  152.63  9.01E+08  4.96E+10  2 
Israel 1  84  85  59.93  1.02E+09  1.06E+11  2 
Italy 14  191  205  288.33  5.19E+09  1.17E+12  2 
Poland 2  49  51  54.93  1.62E+09  1.71E+11  2 
Portugal  18 55 73  203.04  4.33E+08  1.12E+11  2 
Spain 32  120  152  286.68  -6.09E+09  6.03E+11  2 
Panel B: Hybrid Nations (classification dependent on annual rating) 
Greece 4  184  188  77.27  5.24E+09  1.23E+11  2.25 
Turkey 0  20  20  146.93  -6.09E+08 1.83E+11  2.25 
Malaysia  106 648 754  36.32  -6.01E+08 9.10E+10  2.375 
Philippines  18 46 64  55.47  1.17E+09 7.58E+10  2.375 
Argentina 79  60  139  90.66  -5.19E+08 2.51E+11  2.5 
Venezuela 28 28 56  53.70  -2.35E+08 1.00E+11  2.5 
Sri Lanka  0  13  13  11.23  -6,994,878  1.55E+10  2.875 
Panel C: Less Developed Property Rights Nations 
Brazil 241  36  277  112.32  5.86E+09  6.01E+11  3 
India 166  1,062  1,228  9.93  2.70E+09 4.54E+11  3 
Mexico 149  58  207  96.87  3.77E+09  5.00E+11  3 
Bolivia  23 17 40  5.63  -2.90E+07 8.18E+09  3.125 
Peru 58  6  64  17.14  5.00E+08 5.50E+10  3.125 
Colombia  64 24 88  13.58  6.61E+08 9.08E+10  3.25 
Indonesia 85  158  243  60.63  1.60E+08 1.68E+11  3.375 
Pakistan 0  17  17  6.49  -3.06E+07 6.67E+10  3.375 
China 34  905  939  76.86  -5.21E+09  1.10E+12  4 
South Korea  3,141  882  4,023  24.96 9.24E+09  5.03E+11   
Total 9,423  23,280  32,703         
Notes. This table shows the breakdown of the type of securities issued in each country in our sample between the years of 1996-2005. Debt 
(Equity) Issues are the number of firm-years where firm i issued debt (equity) at time t. Average annual proceeds are the average amount issued 
(in millions) in either by firm i at time t. Foreign Portfolio Investment is the level of FPI in current U.S. Dollars. Gross Domestic Product is the 




Table 2. Summary Statistics from 1996-2005 
 
Panel A:  Firm-Level Variables 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Small Firms 
Capital  Dummy  67,731  0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Asset Tangibility  67,355  0.59 0.37 0.56 1.41 
Cash  67,355  0.16 0.17 0.00 0.64 
Cross-listing  67,355  0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Short-term  Leverage  63,553  0.43 19.42 0.00 4896 
Long-term Leverage  64,608  0.11 0.13 0.00 5.81 
Total Leverage  67,355  0.53 0.27 0.05 1.12 
Profitability 67,355  -0.07 0.42 -1.46 0.47 
Risk  67,355  0.08 0.09 0.00 0.49 
Large Firms 
Capital  Dummy  51,144  0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Asset Tangibility  51,144  0.52 0.25 0.09 1.08 
Cash  51,144  0.10 0.11 0.00 0.45 
Cross-listing  51,144  0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Short-term Leverage  49,593  0.35 0.21 0.00 8.00 
Long-term Leverage  45,418  0.16 0.15 0.00 1.92 
Total Leverage  51,144  0.55 0.23 0.11 0.96 
Profitability 51,144  0.02 0.20 -0.59 0.36 
Risk  51,144  0.05 0.06 0.00 0.37 
Panel B: Country-Level Variables 
Corruption  345 3.75 1.37 1.00 6.00 
Domestic  Credit  348 0.96 0.55 0.10 3.22 
Foreign Direct Inv.  348 0.04 0.07  -0.03  0.94 
Fiscal  Burden  312 3.63 0.91 1.00 5.00 
FPI  348 -0.01 0.05 -0.30 0.15 
FPIVol  348 0.12 0.46 0.00 6.26 
∆ FXRate  348  0.06  0.15  -0.24  1.24 
GDP Growth  348  0.03  0.03  -0.13  0.11 
Investment 345  8.32  2.09  3.00  12.00 
Law and Order  345  4.79  1.34  1.00  6.00 
Real Interest Rates  348  0.07  0.10  -0.35  0.78 
Relative Interest Rates 348  0.01  0.02  -0.06  0.12 
Savings 348  0.24  0.09  -0.05  0.53 
Share  348 0.73 0.66 0.03 4.18 
Notes. Asset tangibility is defined as fixed assets divided by the book value of total assets. Cash is defined as cash and/or marketable securities 
scaled by total assets. Cross-listing is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if a firm is cross-listed and zero otherwise. Growth in 
sales/ total assets is defined as the log difference in sales/total assets of firm i. Leverage is total liabilities scaled by total assets. Profitability is 
defined as operating income divided by sales. Risk is defined as the standard deviation of the firm’s profitability ratio over the previous three 
years. Corruption is an assigned value for a given country regarding its level of corruption (0 most corrupt; 6 least corrupt). Dom Credit refers to 
credit provided by financial institutions scaled by GDP. Domestic Credit (banks) refers to credit provided by all banks scaled by GDP. Foreign 
Direct Inv. is the amount of foreign direct investment scaled by GDP. Fiscal Burden is the level of taxation a country imposes on its firms. FPI is 
the investment (in dollars) in the equity of foreign companies. FPI Vol is the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1. ΔFX Rate is the 
log difference in the official exchange rate with the dollar. GDP Growth is the growth rate of gross domestic product. Invest is an index of the 
risk involved in investing in a country. Law and Order is an index that refers to the level of legal development. Property Rights is a measure from 
1 (most effective) to 5 (least effective) measuring the efficacy of a country’s legal system. Real Interest Rates are interest rates adjusted for 
inflation levels. Relative Interest Rates are the annual real interest rates of country j scaled by sample average calculated annually. Share is the 
percent of the world market capitalization represented by a country’s market capitalization.  
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 3. Correlation (Small Firm Sample) 
 
Panel A: Firm-Level Variable Correlation 
  1  2 3  4  5 6 7 
Asset  Tangibility  (1)  1.00         
Cash (2)  -0.41  1.00        
Cross-listing (3)  -0.04 0.05 1.00       
Short-term Leverage (4)  -0.31 -0.06 -0.03  1.00     
Long-term Leverage (5)  0.35 -0.24 -0.01  -0.19  1.00    
Total Leverage (6)  0.09 -0.18 -0.06  0.10  0.21  1.00  
Profitability (7)  0.13  -0.18  -0.06  -0.07 0.12 0.09 1.00 
Risk (8)  -0.10  0.12  0.07  -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 -0.21 
Panel B: Country-Level Variable Correlation 
  1  2 3  4  5 6 7  8  9 10 11  12  13 
GDP  Growth  (1)  1.00                  
Savings (2)  0.22  1 . 0 0                
Domestic Credit (3)  -0.06  0.22 1 . 0 0               
Foreign Direct Inv. (4)  0.10 0.20 0.07 1.00            
Share (5)  0.06  0.29 0.45 0.22 1.00           
Corruption (6)  0.01  0.04 0.23 0.07 0.33 1.00          
Investment (7)  0.01  -0.02 0.27 0.16 0.24 0.24 1.00         
Law and Order (8)  0.09 0.25 0.46 0.15 0.35 0.68 0.26 1.00         
FPIVol (9)  -0.03  0.09 0.08 0.16 0.39 0.07 0.15 0.08  1.00     
Real Interest Rates (10)  -0.07  -0.20 -0.15 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12 -0.26  -0.03 1.00    
Fiscal Burden (11)  -0.06  -0.29 0.13 -0.05 -0.10 0.46 0.29 0.39 -0.09 -0.11 1.00  
Relative Int. Rates (12)  -0.07 -0.19 -0.15 -0.02 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.26  -0.01 0.98 -0.12 1.00 
FXChg (13)  -0.34  -0.02 -0.24 -0.01 -0.15 -0.24 -0.33 -0.30  -0.05 -0.06 -0.14 -0.06 1.00
FPI (14)  0.00  -0.37 -0.10 -0.21 -0.29 -0.11 -0.18 -0.19 -0.35 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.01
Bold font identifies significance of 5%.  
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Table 4. FPI and Small Firm Access to Capital 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Issuance Dummy 
  Developed Property Rights (N=57,247)  Less Developed Property Rights (N=9,169) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FPI  0.338*** 0.307*** 0.339*** 0.316*** 3.390*** 4.266*** 3.060*** 2.900*** 
  [0.087] [0.069] [0.068] [0.081] [0.553] [0.579] [0.561] [0.384] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  0.003  0.017  0.095*  0.004  0.591*** 0.958*** 0.641*** 0.797*** 
  [0.055] [0.066] [0.056] [0.046] [0.192] [0.148] [0.151] [0.137] 
GDP  Growth  1.304*** 1.350*** 1.158*** 1.296*** -0.070  -0.115  -0.095 -0.195** 
  [0.213] [0.217] [0.219] [0.214] [0.106] [0.080] [0.111] [0.079] 
Domestic Credit  0.011*  0.011*  0.015**  0.010*  -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.118*** -0.114*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.025] [0.022] [0.026] [0.024] 
Savings  -0.022 -0.06 -0.083  -0.036  0.729*** 0.762*** 0.656*** 0.605*** 
  [0.079] [0.084] [0.085] [0.078] [0.126] [0.116] [0.139] [0.102] 
Investment    -0.004      -0.013***    
   [0.003]      [0.002]    
Law  and  Order     -0.023***      0.002   
     [0.004]      [0.004]   
Corruption       -0.002       -0.021*** 
      [0.002]      [0.004] 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (1
st stage)  0.439  0.496  0.494  0.487 0.490 0.520 0.492 0.519 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model χ
2  8,406*** 8,413*** 8,484*** 8,407***  978***  983***  978***  999*** 
Notes. The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = γ0 + γ1FPIj,t-1 + γ 2Xi,t-1 + γ 3Yj,t-1 + γ 4Ii + γ 5t + ε.  Development groups are based on the level of property rights in a nation. Only 
small firms (those firms with total assets less than the country-year median) are tested. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents the instrumented value 
obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = β0 + β1ΔFXRatej,t-1 +  β2Sharej,t-1 + β3RelIntRatesj,t-1 + β4FPIVolj,t-1 +  ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is 
country j’s market capitalization scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates are the annual real interest rates of country j scaled by sample average calculated annually. FPIVol is the variance of 
FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables including the following: GDP Growth is the growth rate in gross domestic product of country j. Foreign Direct Inv. is 
the level of foreign direct investment scaled by country j’s GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions, scaled by GDP. Savings is the 
difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived risk facing foreign investors. Law and Order is an index referring to the development of the legal system. 
Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset tangibility.  I is a vector of 
industry dummies to control for industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effects in the panel. Observations are firm year specific and for the term 1996-2005. Firm 
level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered around issuer and are in brackets. Marginal effects of the variables are provided. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 5. FPI and Large Firm Access to Capital 
 
Dependent Variable: Capital Issuance Dummy 
  Developed Property Rights (N=44,058)  Less Developed Property Rights (N=6,772) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FPI -0.278**  -0.132  -0.164*  -0.139 -10.584***  -6.597**  -9.295***  -3.835*** 
  [0.111] [0.098] [0.092] [0.105] [3.115] [2.972] [2.988] [0.968] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  -0.140***  -0.142***  -0.185***  -0.159***  0.860*** 0.145 0.784*** 0.159 
  [0.052] [0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.289] [0.272] [0.302] [0.181] 
GDP Growth  0.814***  0.742***  0.861*** 0.795*** 0.886***  0.420  0.813*** 0.488*** 
  [0.109] [0.087] [0.115] [0.070] [0.322] [0.260] [0.244] [0.160] 
Domestic Credit  0.014***  0.015***  0.010** 0.020***  0.322***  0.119  0.272**  0.064* 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.120] [0.089] [0.118] [0.036] 
Savings -0.210***  -0.128**  -0.116**  -0.101** -1.810***  -0.678  -1.499**  -0.239 
  [0.056] [0.057] [0.052] [0.051] [0.695] [0.542] [0.695] [0.160] 
Investment    0.006***      0.020*    
    [0.002]      [0.010]    
Law and Order      0.021***        -0.005   
     [0.004]        [0.006]   
Corruption      0.016***      0.038*** 
      [0.002]      [0.008] 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (1
st stage)  0.326  0.330  0.340  0.330 0.418 0.443 0.426 0.431 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model χ
2  3,851*** 3,899*** 3,859*** 3,875*** 1,443*** 1,445*** 1,455*** 1,446*** 
Notes. The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = γ0 + γ1FPIj,t-1 + γ 2Xi,t-1 + γ 3Yj,t-1+ γ 4Ii + γ 5t + ε. Development groups are based on the level of property rights in a nation. Only 
large firms (those firms with total assets greater than the country-year median) are tested. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents the instrumented 
value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = β0 + β1ΔFXRatej,t-1 +  β2Sharej,t-1 + β3RelIntRatesj,t-1 + β4FPIVolj,t-1 +  ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is 
country j’s market capitalization scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates are the annual real interest rates of country j scaled by sample average calculated annually. FPIVol is the variance of 
FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables including the following: GDP Growth is the growth rate in gross domestic product of country j. Foreign Direct Inv. is 
the level of foreign direct investment scaled by country j’s GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions, scaled by GDP. Savings is the 
difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived risk facing foreign investors. Law and Order is an index referring to the development of the legal system. 
Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset tangibility. I is a vector of 
industry dummies to control for industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effects in the panel. Observations are firm year specific and for the term 1996-2005. Firm 
level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered around issuer and are in brackets. Marginal effects of the variables are provided. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 6. FPI and Small Firm Access to Bank Credit 
 
Dependent Variable: Capital Issuance Dummy 














  OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
FPI 4.849  0.05  0.134***  0.203***  0.312***  0.257***  -2.561***  -2.879***  -1.566***  -1.638***  -4.472***  -4.986*** 
 [4.802]  [0.053]  [0.032]  [0.028]  [0.103]  [0.061]  [0.560]  [0.717]  [0.413]  [0.473]  [0.659]  [0.817] 
Fiscal Burden  -0.164  -0.006***  -0.004**  -0.005***  0.036***  0.016***  0.006  0.006  0.016***  0.021***  0.010  0.001** 
 [0.184]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.006]  [0.002]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.007]  [0.006] 
Domestic Credit  -0.011  0.026***  0.006***  0.011***  0.039***  0.004***  0.101***  0.029***  -0.036**  -0.057***  0.045  0.077** 
 [0.037]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.005]  [0.002]  [0.024]  [0.029]  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.030]  [0.031] 
Real Interest Rate  -3.555  -0.400***  -0.049  -0.072***  0.075  0.493***  0.086***  0.085***  -0.032*  -0.026*  0.123***  0.078*** 
 [3.158]  [0.050]  [0.044]  [0.027]  [0.077]  [0.057]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.017]  [0.015]  [0.030]  [0.026] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  -0.570  0.059*  -0.047*  -0.113***  -0.052  -0.123***  -0.814***  0.144***  -0.639***  -0.635***  -1.636***  -1.334*** 
 [0.637]  [0.032]  [0.029]  [0.017]  [0.042]  [0.036]  [0.237]  [0.191]  [0.163]  [0.125]  [0.282]  [0.212] 
GDP Growth  4.316  -0.721***  0.119*  0.341***  -0.648***  0.322***  0.037  -0.090***  0.289***  0.260***  0.113  0.398*** 
 [5.040]  [0.057]  [0.069]  [0.031]  [0.142]  [0.064]  [0.101]  [0.107]  [0.068]  [0.072]  [0.116]  [0.122] 
Savings 1.581  0.289***  -0.011  -0.003  0.362***  -0.329***  -0.168  -0.170***  -0.124  -0.151***  -0.319*  -0.151*** 
 [1.294]  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.012]  [0.053]  [0.026]  [0.135]  [0.169]  [0.094]  [0.105]  [0.170]  [0.180] 
Constant 2.399  0.390***  0.114***  0.094***  0.409***  0.096***  0.391***  0.404***  0.110***  -1.902***  0.609***  0.042*** 
 [2.012]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.007]  [0.064]  [0.015]  [0.039]  [0.042]  [0.027]  [0.028]  [0.051]  [0.047] 
Industry  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  53,925 53,925 54,872 54,872 57,247 57,247  8,753  8,753  8,801  8,801  9,169  9,169 
Model R
2  0.01  0.12  0.10  0.08  0.14  0.12  
Model χ
2   4708***  7778***  4737***   941***   1751***   796*** 
Notes. The following robust OLS regression is specified: (Short-term/Long-term/Total) Lev i,t = φ0 + φ1FPIj,t-1 + φ 2Xi,t-1 + φ 3Yj,t-1+ φ4Ii + φ5t + ε. Specifications (1) and (4) use short-term leverage scaled 
by total assets as the dependent variable. Specifications (2) and (5) use long-term leverage scaled by total assets as the dependent variable. Specifications (3) and (6) use total liabilities scaled by total 
assets as the dependent variable. Development subsamples are based on the level of property rights in a nation. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents 
the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = β0 + ΔFXRatej,t-1β1 +  Sharej,t-1β2 + Libj,t-1 β3 + FPIVolj,t-1 β4 +  t + ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real foreign 
exchange rate. Share is country j’s market capitalization scaled by world market capitalization.  FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic 
variables including the following: GDP Growth is the growth rate in gross domestic product of country j. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Savings is the 
difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Fiscal Burden is a measure of the level of taxes usurped by the government from corporations from 1 (fewer taxes) to 5 (higher taxes). Real 
Int. Rates is country j’s interest rate adjusted for inflation. X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset tangibility. I is a vector of 
industry dummies to control for industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effects in the panel. Observations are firm year specific and for the term 1996-2005. Firm 
level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered around issuer and are in brackets.  
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%.  
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Table 7. Interaction with Investment Environment 
 
Dependent Variable: Capital Issuance Dummy 
  1 2 3 
Foreign Direct Inv.  -0.103***  -0.175***  -0.052* 
 [0.038]  [0.023]  [0.028] 
GDP Growth  0.848***  1.412***  1.070*** 
 [0.138]  [0.195]  [0.167] 
Domestic Credit  0.010**  0.037***  0.014** 
 [0.005]  [0.009]  [0.006] 
Savings -0.021  -0.530***  -0.132 
 [0.053]  [0.115]  [0.094] 
FPI 3.157**  6.405***  1.412*** 
 [1.366]  [1.035]  [0.345] 
FPI* Investment  -0.277**     
 [0.118]     
Investment 0.001    
 [0.002]     
FPI* Law and Order    -1.400***   
   [0.227]   
Law and Order    -0.019***   
   [0.003]   
FPI* Corruption      -0.363 
     [0.356] 
Corruption     -0.001 
     [0.004] 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 66,901  66,901  66,901 
R
2 (1
st stage)  0.447  0.446  0.442 
F-Test (instr.)  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
Model χ
2 9,050***  9,055***  9,071*** 
Notes. The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = γ0 + γ1FPIj,t-1 + γ2Xi,t-1 + γ 3Yj,t-1+ γ4Ii + γ5 t + ε. FPI is foreign portfolio 
investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t 
= β0 + β1ΔFXRatej,t-1 +  β2Sharej,t-1 + β3RelIntRatesj,t-1 + β4FPIVolj,t-1 + ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is 
country j’s market capitalization scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates are the annual real interest rates of country j scaled by sample 
average calculated annually. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables 
including the following: GDP Growth is the growth rate in gross domestic product of country j. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct 
investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions, scaled by 
GDP. Savings is the difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived risk facing foreign investors. Law 
and Order is an index referring to the development of the legal system. Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. X is a vector of 
lagged firm-specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset tangibility. I is a vector of industry dummies to 
control for industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effects in the panel. Observations are firm year specific and 
for the term 1996-2005. Firm level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors clustered around issuer and are in brackets. 
Marginal effects of the variables are provided. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%.  
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Table 8. Robustness 
 
  Developed Property Rights Nations  Less Developed Property Rights Nations 
  Capital Markets  Debt  Capital Markets  Debt 
Capital Issuance Dummy  Capital Issuance Dummy 








Debt  Total Debt 
  1 2  3  4  5 6 7  8  9  10 
Expected Sign  +  -  Insignificant  +  +  +  -  -  -  - 
Panel A: Key Variable Definition 
1. FPI Net Flow scaled by Gross Private Capital Flows 
FPI 34.563***  -87.481***  301.717  7.508***  16.133**  11.233  -77.403***  -88.443***  -24.325***  -130.270*** 
 [9.794]  [10.559]  [302.169]  [2.059]  [6.882]  [14.257]  [19.024]  [11.079]  [6.970]  [13.112] 
Observations 57,153  43,977  53,834  54,778  57,153 9,169  6,772 8,753 8,801 9,169 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.238 0.208  0.000  0.126  0.097 0.069 0.220  0.001  0.130  . 
2. FPI scaled by GDP  winsorized at 1%  
FPI  0.336*** -0.329***  4.843  0.135*** 0.313*** 3.390***  -10.584***  -2.561***  -1.566***  -4.472*** 
  [0.063] [0.111]  [4.796]  [0.032]  [0.103] [0.493] [2.957]  [0.560]  [0.413]  [0.659] 
Observations 57,247  44,058  53,925  54,872  57,247 9,169  6,772 8,753 8,801 9,169 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.206 0.069  0.000  0.124  0.100 0.213 0.220  0.084  0.144  0.121 
3. Percentage Change in FPI Net Flow 
FPI  0.016*** -0.060***  0.242  0.008*** 0.017*** 0.002***  0.001  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.004*** 
  [0.004] [0.004]  [0.239]  [0.002]  [0.006] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001] 
Observations 56,991  43,799  53,669  54,613  56,991 9,739  6,764 9,313 9,339 9,739 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.205 0.069  0.000  0.009  0.001 0.252 0.218  0.090  0.171  0.146 
4. FPI Volatility based on five-year term 
FPI  0.310*** -0.456***  5.379  0.163*** 0.448*** 3.067*** -9.883***  -2.493***  -1.425***  -4.357*** 
  [0.073] [0.117]  [5.264]  [0.042]  [0.104] [0.544] [3.216]  [0.580]  [0.435]  [0.676] 
Observations 56,919  43,799  53,607  54,544  56,919 9,157  6,739 8,741 8,789 9,157 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.206 0.213  0.000  0.123  0.098 0.069 0.220  0.085  0.148  0.123 
Panel B: Sample Inclusion 
1. Excluding countries with capital control changes 
FPI 0.148***  -0.384***  5.850  0.132***  0.226***  1.539***  -2.210***  1.169***  -0.132  1.390*** 
  [0.055] [0.072]  [4.466]  [0.025]  [0.045] [0.224] [0.613]  [0.344]  [0.263]  [0.411] 
Observations 53,743  40,868  50,629  51,441  53,743 6,179  4,559 5,847 5,952 6,179 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.236 0.324  0.001  0.129  0.162 0.076 0.252  0.125  0.135  0.169 
2. Bottom third of total assets by country-year 
FPI 0.426***  -0.161*  4.905  0.107***  0.458***  3.678***  -2.961**  2.847  -1.941*  -3.863** 
  [0.153] [0.095]  [4.843]  [0.033]  [0.069] [0.961] [1.416]  [2.144]  [1.021]  [1.819] 
Observations 28,918  45,240  27,058  28,361  28,931 4,517  6,492 4,312 4,392 4,518 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.359 0.390  0.001  0.080  0.179 0.072 0.246  0.086  0.097  0.162 
  




   40 
 
 
Table 8. Robustness (Continued) 
 
  Developed Property Rights Nations  Less Developed Property Rights Nations 
  Capital Markets  Debt  Capital Markets  Debt 
Capital Issuance Dummy  Capital Issuance Dummy 








Debt Total  Debt 
  1 2  3  4  5 6 7  8  9  10 
Expected Sign  +  -  Insignificant  +  +  +  -  -  -  - 
3. Only Equity Issues 
FPI  0.191*** -0.278**  4.998  0.127***  0.312*** 1.833***  -10.584***  -2.459***  -1.709***  -4.393*** 
  [0.054] [0.111]  [4.943]  [0.032]  [0.106] [0.480] [2.877]  [0.575]  [0.421]  [0.664] 
Observations 55,792  44,058  52,495  53,431  55,792 9,045  6,772 8,629 8,677 9,045 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.217 0.069  0.000  0.128  0.102 0.242 0.220  0.085  0.149  0.126 
Panel C: Methodology 
1. Clustered Errors at Industry Level 
FPI 0.326***  -0.277**  4.969  0.124  0.350*  3.388***  -16.479***  -2.510***  -1.585***  -4.431*** 
  [0.068] [0.110]  [4.706]  [0.074]  [0.159] [0.258] [3.966]  [0.497]  [0.377]  [0.550] 
Observations 57,247  44,058  53,925  54,872  57,247 9,169  6,772 8,753 8,801 9,169 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.202 0.209  0.000  0.092  0.090 0.063 0.213  0.077  0.134  0.117 
2: Country Dummies 
FPI  0.305*** -0.388**  14.005  -0.117  0.713*** 3.398*** -3.127** -1.801*  0.245  -1.868* 
  [0.107] [0.189]  [13.097]  [0.076]  [0.183] [0.548] [1.402]  [1.091]  [0.568]  [0.977] 
Observations 54,660  43,145  53,924  54,871  57,247 9,103  6,772 8,753 8,801 9,169 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2 0.324  .  0.001  0.152  0.107  0.235  .  0.118  0.178  0.205 
3: Frequency Weights 
FPI 0.338***  -0.827***  4.849  0.134***  0.312***  3.390***  -2.68***  -2.561***  -1.566***  -4.472*** 
  [0.086] [0.088]  [4.802]  [0.032]  [0.103] [0.556] [0.979]  [0.560]  [0.413]  [0.659] 
Observations 57,247  63,510  53,925  54,872  57,247 9,169  9,435 8,753 8,801 9,169 
Pseudo R
2 / R
2  0.206 0.213  0.000  0.124  0.100 0.150 0.521  0.084  0.144  0.121 
Notes. For capital markets, the following probit model is specified:  P(Capital Issuance)i,t = γ0 + γ1FPIj,t-1 + γ2Xi,t-1 + γ 3Yj,t-1+ γ4Ii + γ5 t + ε.  FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross 
domestic product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression:  FPIj,t = β0 + β1ΔFXRatej,t-1 +  β2Sharej,t-1 + β3RelIntRatesj,t-1 + β4FPIVolj,t-1 + ε.. For Debt, the 
following robust OLS regression is specified: (Short-term/Long-term/Total) Lev i,t = φ0 + φ1FPIj,t-1 + φ 2Xi,t-1 + φ 3Yj,t-1+ φ4Ii + φ5t + ε. Specifications (3) and (8) use short-term leverage scaled by total 
assets as the dependent variable.  Specifications (4) and (9) use long-term leverage scaled by total assets as the dependent variable. Specifications (5) and (10) use total liabilities scaled by total assets as 
the dependent variable. Development sub samples are based on the level of property rights in a nation. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents the 
instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression:  FPIj,t = β0 + ΔFXRatej,t-1β1 +  Sharej,t-1β2 + Libj,t-1 β3 + FPIVolj,t-1 β4 +  t + ε. X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as 
cash flow, debt/asset level, risk, profitability, and asset tangibility. ΔFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market capitalization scaled by world market 
capitalization.  RelIntRates are the annual real interest rates of country j scaled by sample average calculated annually. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. Y is a vector of lagged 
macroeconomic variables including the following: GDP Growth, Foreign Direct Inv., Domestic Credit, Savings. For Debt regressions, Y also includes Fiscal Burden and Real Int.Rates. I is a vector of 
industry dummies to control for industry effects (in all specifications except those clustered by industry) and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effects in the panel (in all 
specifications). Panel A examines different key variable definitions. Panel B examines different sample inclusion criteria. Panel C examines different methodology extrapolations. Observations are firm-
year specific and for the term 1996-2005. Control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  Marginal effects of the variables are provided. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%.  
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Figure I. Scatter Plots of FPI and Capital Issuance 
 
 









Notes. These graphs are partial scatter plots obtained from Specification 1 in Table 4: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = γ0 + FPIj,t-1 γ1  + 
Xi,t-1 γ2  + Yj,t-1 γ3 + Ii + t + ε. Nations with (less) developed property rights are those with property rights indices equal to a “1” or 
“2” (“3” or “4”). For tractability, each dot represents a country-year. 
 